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LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALISM AND ITS CRITICS 
 
Mareike Kleine and Mark Pollack 
 
 
In 1993, an article published in the Journal of Common Market Studies, entitled 
‘Preferences and Power in the European Community’, caused a great stir in the field of 
European Union (EU) studies. Its author, Andrew Moravcsik, contended that students and 
practitioners of European integration had gotten this process all wrong. Instead of being 
driven by geopolitical interests or grand ideas, he argued, European integration was 
largely about the pursuit of economic preferences. And instead of being nudged into 
relinquishing ever more authority to powerful supranational elites, the member states 
were almost always in full control of the integration process, pooling and delegating 
national sovereignty to the minimum extent necessary to make their mutual commitments 
credible. Moravcsik later backed his claims with extensive empirical evidence of the 
EU’s main treaty bargains in his magnum opus The Choice for Europe (1998). 
 
In the years that followed, Moravcsik further developed the theory of liberal 
intergovernmentalism (LI), supplementing its three core claims about national preference 
formation, intergovernmental bargaining, and institutional choice with three extensions: a 
defense of the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’, the claim that the EU had reached a stable 
‘constitutional settlement’, and the argument that Europe had emerged as the world’s 
‘second superpower’. While the core claims defined LI, the extensions are logical 
corollaries of the theory with respect to some of the major questions facing the Union 
over the past 25 years, and on all counts Moravcsik defended the Union against some of 
its most severe critics and skeptics. 
 
Few debates have shaped the field of EU studies more than the debate between LI and its 
many contenders. Within a decade of the publication of ‘Preferences and Power’, LI had 
emerged as the leading and arguably the ‘baseline theory’ (Moravcsik and 
Schimmelfennig 2009: 67) of European integration; yet its core assumptions, empirical 
claims, and normative implications remained hotly disputed. First, LI’s political economy 
model of preference formation has been questioned both by constructivist scholars, who 
contend that EU norms and rules shape national preferences, and by postfunctionalists 
who claim that, in an increasingly politicized EU, domestic preferences follow broad 
identity-based movements rather than functional, issue-specific interests. Second, the 
bargaining theory has similarly come under fire, both from constructivist scholars who 
argue that EU decision-making is more deliberative than Moravcsik’s model allows, and 
from ‘supranationalists’ who argue that the EU governments share influence with 
supranational actors such as the Commission, the European Parliament (EP), the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ), and the European Central Bank (ECB). Third, LI’s 
model of institutional choice has been criticized by historical institutionalists for ignoring 
endogenous feedback that destabilizes the equilibrium and creates pressure for further 
institutional choices, be it for more or for less integration. 
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Scholars similarly took aim at Moravcsik’s three extensions, arguing that the EU’s 
democratic deficit, far from being ‘defensible’, is severe and possibly worsening; that the 
EU is not a stable constitutional settlement but instead faces the prospect of 
disintegration; and that the Union, far from being a superpower, systematically punches 
below its weight in world affairs. 
 
In this special issue, we and our contributors join the ongoing debate about LI, its core 
claims and extensions, and its continuing relevance in an EU that is more politicized and 
facing crises far beyond those experienced in the—in retrospect—halcyon days of the 
early 1990s when Moravcsik published his first, seminal statement of the theory in the 
pages of this journal. Since then, the Great Recession triggered the Eurozone crisis and 
fierce conflicts between debtor and creditor states about the zone’s institutional design. 
That continuing crisis was soon overshadowed by a large influx of migrants from the 
Middle East and Africa that prompted an even more furious debate about the design of 
the Schengen area and the EU’s asylum regime. Meanwhile, populist Euroskeptic parties 
gained a foothold in the European party landscape, bringing to power illiberal 
governments in Hungary and Poland, and culminating in the British decision to ‘Brexit’.  
 
Taken together, these crises raise a series of challenges for LI. To what extent can LI 
explain the origin and consequences of these crises? Do the broader trends that underpin 
these crises pose a fundamental challenge to LI’s theory of preference formation, 
bargaining, and institutional choice? Have they shattered LI’s optimism about the EU’s 
democratic legitimacy, constitutional stability, and global superpower status? In this 
special issue, these and other questions are tackled by many of Moravcsik’s leading 
interlocutors, each of whom grapples with the question of LI’s continuing relevance in a 
politicized EU, and by Moravcsik himself, who responds to his critics and assesses the 
past and future of LI in the concluding article. 
 
In this introduction, we set the stage for this 25-year reassessment, by reviewing 
Moravcsik’s theoretical and empirical claims as well as the challenges posed by some of 
his leading critics. We begin in Part I with a brief review of the debates prompted by the 
core claims about national preference formation, intergovernmental bargaining, and 
institutional choice. We argue that the most recent and arguably most fundamental 
challenge at the current moment of crisis comes from postfunctionalists, who argue that 
the EU has become politicized in ways not appreciated in LI’s original formulation. An 
important research question for the future will be to explore if or under what conditions 
identity is overtaking functional interests in the formation of national preferences, and to 
what extent these dynamics impact European integration and, potentially, disintegration. 
Second, we examine Moravcsik’s three extensions, noting both their derivation from LI 
and the substantial disputes generated by each. Here again, the postfunctionalist critique 
is central, as the rise of anti-European populism across the Union poses fundamental 
challenges to the EU’s democratic legitimacy, the stability of its constitutional settlement, 
and its role in the world. As we shall note in the conclusion, however, Moravcsik himself 
retains a cautious optimism about the future of the Union. 
 
The Core of Liberal Intergovernmentalism, and Its Critics 
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The key to understanding LI is the premise that rational individuals and private groups 
with autonomous and differentiated interests are the fundamental actors in international 
politics (Moravcsik 1993, 483). These pluralist interests are in constant competition for 
influence on the state, and the victorious actors in this domestic struggle get to define the 
preferences that the government pursues in interaction with other states. It follows that 
we simply cannot understand state behavior and power unless we first understand what 
fundamental purpose each state seeks—a purpose that is shaped by interests at the 
domestic level. 
 
The importance of the premise of domestically defined state interests sets LI apart from 
realism, institutionalism, and other schools that theorize state preferences as unitary and 
fixed (Moravcsik 1998, 20).  It also implies a particular approach to the analysis of 
international politics:  if state preferences are to be problematized rather than assumed, 
then international outcomes cannot be analyzed solely at the systemic level. Moravcsik 
therefore rejects mono-causal theories in favor of an analytical approach that allows for 
complex yet coherent multi-causal explanations, rooted in a thorough understanding of 
state-society relations, interstate bargaining and institutions. Instead, he argues, any 
explanation of international politics has to be disaggregated and modeled as a process of 
successive stages, with the aggregation of state interests at the national level as the 
invariable starting point (Moravcsik 1993, 482; 1997).   
 
In ‘Preferences and Power’ and later Choice, Moravcsik applied this way of thinking to 
European integration in the form of what is now widely known as Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism. The theory follows in the footsteps of earlier intergovernmentalist 
writers, notably Moravcsik’s late mentor Stanley Hoffmann, regarding its emphasis on 
the obstinacy of the nation state as well as in its appreciation of diverse national interests 
(Hoffmann 1966). However, LI is ‘liberal’ insofar as it, like neofunctionalism, 
emphasizes the pluralist condition of modern international politics as rooted in the 
preferences of individuals and interest groups (Moravcsik 1997, 535). 
 
From the perspective of LI, the EU is the world’s most successful international policy-
coordination regime (Moravcsik 1993, 473), established in successive agreements by 
governments to pool national sovereignty through majority voting and to delegate 
authority to semi-autonomous central institutions (509). True to the liberal framework, 
Moravcsik posits that in order to analyze integration outcomes, scholars should 
disaggregate Europe’s important treaty negotiations into three separate stages, each of 
which employs a distinct theory to explain, respectively, (1) the aggregation of domestic 
interests into national preferences for integration, (2) distributive bargaining among EU 
governments pursuing these preferences, and (3) the design of institutions to secure and 
implement collective bargains (Moravcsik 1998, 24). Analyzing the EU’s most important 
treaty negotiations from the Treaties of Rome to the Treaty of Maastricht, Moravcsik 
argues that these major integration steps were driven by issue-specific functional 
demands from societal interests; that intergovernmental bargains about these steps 
tracked state bargaining power; and that European governments rationally designed EU 
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institutions to ensure the credibility of their commitments (Moravcsik 1998, 2-4).  Let us 
explore each of these, briefly, in turn. 
 
The Liberal Account of National Preference Formation 
 
The first stage of LI is about the formation of state preferences. Here, Moravcsik refutes 
earlier theories that cited either security concerns or federalist ideas as the driving forces 
behind European integration. In contrast, Moravcsik argues that the liberal premise of the 
fundamental role of private actors and groups implies a more complex but no less 
systematic explanation (Moravcsik 1993, 484). 
 
From the liberal perspective, Moravcsik argues, it is important to consider that 
international cooperation typically creates domestic winners and losers such that different 
policy areas engender different distributions of costs and benefits for societal groups, 
from which follow variations in patterns of domestic political mobilization (Moravcsik 
1993, 488). Where gains are concentrated and costs diffuse, the beneficiaries of 
integration face fewer obstacles to political mobilization than its losers, making it more 
difficult for any government to ignore their demands when weighting them against 
broader regulatory and fiscal objectives. Where the costs are concentrated and the gains 
diffuse, the opposite pattern emerges. However, where integration effects are uncertain, 
there will be little mobilization and more room for leaders to follow different, even 
personal motives (488-496). Analyzing how the governments of Germany, France and 
Great Britain aggregated the preferences of domestic constituencies, Moravcsik finds that 
the trajectory of integration from Rome to Maastricht largely followed these predicted 
patterns. European integration during this time, he argues, reflected primarily domestic 
economic interests, as articulated by producer groups, whereas geopolitical and 
ideological motivations played a secondary role and prevailed only where the distribution 
of economic gains was uncertain (Moravcsik 1998, 3). 
 
The LI account of national preference formation has been challenged on both theoretical 
and empirical grounds. We focus here on two such challenges, the first from 
constructivists who argue that national preferences are endogenously shaped by EU 
membership, and the second from postfunctionalists who argue that the EU has become 
politicized in ways not captured by LI. 
 
Constructivists reject LI’s assumption of rational domestic actors with exogenously 
formed preferences existing independently of EU structures and processes of deliberation 
(Risse forthcoming; Schmidt 2018). In this view, European social norms not only 
regulate behavior, but also define actors’ very interests and identities. Not least after 
Moravcsik’s own call for more rigorous work (Moravcsik 2001), numerous constructivist 
studies explored how EU membership feeds back through a process of ‘Europeanization’ 
(Cowles et al 2001) or ‘socialization’ (Zürn and Checkel 2005) to affect how European 
states define their interests (Risse 2010). The central empirical question that this body of 
work raises is how European ideas and identity exert an independent influence on the 
formulation of national preferences. This research question, in turn, has gained new 
prominence in the past decade in the context of the ‘postfunctionalist challenge’. 
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Postfunctionalists question LI’s model of preference formation, with its strong emphasis 
on issue-specific interests, instead emphasizing the increased salience of European 
integration as an issue in domestic mass politics, and one that implicates issues of identity 
as well as economic interests (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 11). This claim, they argue, puts 
the finger on LI’s predictive limits: Because LI mainly attributes salience and political 
mobilization to the certainty and distribution of (economic) integration gains, it struggles 
to explain mass mobilization around issues that touch upon matters of identity. In this 
issue, Frank Schimmelfennig (2018b) illustrates the postfunctionalist challenge with a 
description of the political mobilization that culminated in the 2016 Brexit vote. In this 
case, the costs of leaving were at best unclear and at worst likely to inflict serious 
economic harm on many of those voters that opted for ‘Brexit’, and so LI would have 
expected the British public to opt to remain in the EU. Against this background, 
Schimmelfennig argues that postfunctionalism does a better job than LI in explaining the 
otherwise puzzling referendum outcome. 
 
The postfunctionalist challenge is arguably still more empirical than theoretical, since it 
has yet to define clear, testable predictions about the political consequences of the 
observed change in political cleavages (Hooghe and Marks 2018, 126; Grande and Hutter 
2016, 16). However, it has inspired a host of sophisticated studies of media coverage and 
public opinion in Europe, and the combined findings indeed suggest changes in the 
salience of EU politics, an expansion of audiences engaged in monitoring EU affairs, and 
new dynamics of mobilization around issues of identity (de Wilde, Leupold, and 
Schmidtke 2016, 4; Hobolt and de Vries 2016). Thus, growing empirical evidence of 
identity-based, anti-EU mobilization suggests, at the very least, the omission of an 
important variable in LI’s theory of preference formation. 
 
The origins of recent changes in the domestic political landscape and especially their 
consequences for European governance are therefore important questions on the EU 
studies research agenda. Are the growing politicization and salience of EU politics a 
direct response to the transfer of authority to the EU or are they part of a broader 
phenomenon that affects Western liberal democracies more generally? How do the new 
dynamics of politicization translate into actual integration outcomes given that domestic 
conflict structures and elite strategies significantly moderate patterns of politicization 
across countries and over time (Grande and Kriesi 2016, 281)? What factors moderate the 
responsiveness of governments to the mobilization of mass publics? Finally, rather than 
asking whether economic interests or ideas better explain the interests of individuals and 
firms, it seems imperative to explore the ways in which economic interests and ideas 
interact to form complex patterns of preferences (Owen and Walter 2017, 188-90).  
 
In this volume, Kathleen McNamara (2018), Simon Hix (2018), and Vivien Schmidt 
(2018) all raise questions about the possible causes and consequences of EU 
politicization. McNamara takes the view that politicization is the inevitable result of the 
EU’s steady centralization of political power. Approaching the EU as a case of state-
building, she calls for greater attention to the role of shared culture and identity in shoring 
up the EU’s political authority, and finds that the Union has been unable to engender the 
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same deep attachment as national political communities. The strategies of elites to frame 
the EU as banal, McNamara argues, are now backfiring as this ‘emergent political 
authority’ finds itself ill-equipped to weather severe crises in the face of citizens’ weak 
bond to the Union. The theme of politicization is also central to Hix’s analysis of the 
EU’s democratic deficit, and to Schmidt’s analysis of the EU’s supranational actors, as 
we shall see below. 
 
Understood broadly as a framework for theorizing state-society interactions, LI is in 
principle capable of accommodating and theorizing a world in which EU policies become 
politicized as they touch upon highly salient issues – particularly where that politicization 
can be linked to a clear instance of EU policy failure, as in the Eurozone and refugee 
crises (Moravcsik 2018: xx).  Nevertheless, it is clear that a more politicized and 
mobilized EU will be—and already is—very different from the one depicted in Choice, 
and it is of utmost importance to understand the causes and consequences of this shift. 
 
The Intergovernmentalist Account of EU Bargaining 
 
Once national interests have been aggregated and governments tasked with their pursuit, 
states find themselves in different configurations of interdependence. In some cases, 
described mostly by realists, interests are zero-sum: one state’s gain is another state’s loss. 
In other cases, state interests are harmonious. In many cases, however, motives are mixed, 
such that an exchange of concessions and mutual adjustments can increase the welfare of 
all parties (Moravcsik 1997, 521). The challenge governments then face collectively is to 
attain the best possible outcome for all, while reconciling conflicts about the precise 
terms of cooperation (Moravcsik 1993, 496-497). 
 
Distributive bargaining among member governments about the terms of cooperation is 
the second stage of LI. Moravcsik disagrees with the neofunctionalist claim that 
governments, with their vast information-gathering capacity and experience, require the 
help of supranational actors to ‘upgrade the common interest’ (Moravcsik 1999, 273). 
Instead, he draws his preferred explanation of negotiation outcomes from game-theoretic 
bargaining analysis. Starting from the assumption that intergovernmental conferences are 
non-coercive and information-rich settings, he argues that because intergovernmental 
bargaining tends to be efficient, negotiations typically revolve around distributional 
questions (Moravcsik 1993, 499). Drawing on the concept of power as asymmetric 
interdependence—a concept developed by his mentor Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye 
(Keohane and Nye 1977)—he argues further that bargaining outcomes will reflect issue-
specific patterns of interdependence: States with attractive alternatives to European 
integration are in a good position to set the terms of cooperation, while states that depend 
on the cooperation of others will have less influence (Morvavcsik 1993: 481).  
 
Although LI’s theory of distributional bargaining was developed for the context of 
intergovernmental conferences, it has been applied more broadly to EU decision-making. 
In his review of Council scholarship in this issue, Daniel Naurin (2018) shows that many 
scholars have disputed but few ever refuted Moravcsik’s findings about the dominant role 
of the EU governments and the distributional outcomes among them. Naurin argues that 
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LI has indeed become a baseline theory for studies of intergovernmental negotiations, at 
intergovernmental conferences, in the European Council and even in the Council of 
Ministers where majority rule prevails and other supranational actors are more strongly 
involved in the decision-making process. Nevertheless, Naurin also notes that some 
theoretical challenges to LI remain, and we focus here on two of them, the first to 
Moravcsik’s depiction of intergovernmental bargaining, and the second to the assertion 
that governments are in control of negotiation processes and outcomes.  
 
Among the first group, a purported ‘new’ intergovernmentalism agrees with LI about the 
centrality of EU member governments, and indeed asserts that the EU’s member 
governments have become more central over the past decade, as the European Council 
has emerged as the Union’s main crisis management venue and governments have 
increasingly sidelined the Commission by delegating powers to more easily controlled de 
novo bodies. By contrast with LI, however, new intergovernmentalists dispute 
Moravcsik’s bargaining model, instead depicting the European Council as an arena for 
deliberation and persuasion where leaders seek consensual outcomes that downplay the 
controversial and political nature of their decisions (Bickerton, Hodson, and Puetter 2015, 
711; Fabbrini and Puetter 2016, 486).  
 
It is debatable whether this strand of intergovernmentalism really offers a new and 
distinct theoretical framework (Schimmelfennig 2015, 724-726). For one, the search for 
consensual outcomes is as old as European integration itself (Kleine 2013, 91). Moreover, 
the claim that EU negotiations are best characterized as deliberation rather than hard 
bargaining echoes a well-established constructivist argument that has gained a foothold in 
EU studies over the past two decades (Lewis 1998). This ‘deliberative turn’ has produced 
a host of studies that explore the power of ideas and communication in the EU 
institutions (Schmidt 2008) and within the broader European public sphere(s) (Risse 
2010). Moreover, as Moravcsik argues in this issue (2018: xx), and constructivists readily 
admit (Risse forthcoming), observations of deliberation are not incompatible with a 
rationalist and, thus, liberal intergovernmentalist perspective on interstate negotiations. In 
this sense, the newness of the new intergovernmentalism is open to question. 
 
Beyond the question of how to characterize intergovernmental bargaining in the EU, a 
second group of scholars has questioned LI’s emphasis on the intergovernmental Council 
and European Council, which increasingly share power with supranational actors like the 
Commission and the EP. Moravcsik’s writings on this question have been nuanced. On 
the one hand, he has argued forcefully that EU member governments are fully capable of 
bargaining efficiently amongst themselves, and that supranational entrepreneurship is 
largely ‘late, redundant, futile, and sometimes even counterproductive’ (Moravcsik 1999: 
269-70). On the other hand, Moravcsik has conceded the role (albeit constrained) of the 
Commission in day-to-day regulation, as well as the growing authority of the EP in the 
legislative process (Moravcsik 2002: 612), and the greater-than-expected autonomy of 
the ECJ in pursuing EU legal integration (Moravcsik 2005: 363). 
 
As a broadly rationalist framework theory, LI is consistent with institutionalist 
approaches that begin with similar assumptions about rational, utility-maximizing 
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member states and theorize the conditions under which supranational actors can act 
autonomously from, and set the agenda for, member governments in day-to-day 
policymaking (Pollack 2003, forthcoming). However, an intergovernmentalist 
perspective would still insist that governments allow supranational influence to go only 
so far, and that they will seek to reassert their control over outcomes when these threaten 
to make governments look bad in the eyes of influential constituencies (Kleine 2013, 
158). 
 
In her contribution to this issue, Schmidt (2018) argues that the question of ‘Who’s in 
charge?’ remains a bone of contention, but the debate has moved in a constructivist 
direction. In this reading, the dominant cleavage in EU studies is among three schools of 
thought, all of which take ideas and discourse seriously, although each locates ideational 
and discursive power in different hands. The ‘new intergovernmentalists’ see 
governments as the key actors in an increasingly deliberative European Council, while 
‘new supranationalists’ counter that supranational actors have in fact grown in influence 
since the crisis, engaging in ideational entrepreneurship and taking quiet advantage of 
new enforcement powers. A third group, dubbed ‘new parliamentarists’, argues that the 
EP remains influential, not least by virtue of its legitimacy as the Union’s only directly 
elected body.  
 
One important frontier for the study of supranational institutions concerns the autonomy 
and effectiveness of the ECJ in advancing the process of legal integration.  Although 
Moravcsik has largely conceded the unexpected role of the ECJ, Will Phelan’s (2018) 
contribution to this special issue puts forward a revisionist argument for a ‘more liberal 
intergovernmentalist’ theory of the Court and EU legal integration—liberal in 
emphasizing how the supranational legal order was adapted to the needs of highly 
interdependent states and the demands of export-oriented interests, and intergovernmental 
in the sense that member governments, while not anticipating the Court’s actions, 
nevertheless approved of key developments in the construction of the new European legal 
order.  Phelan’s reinterpretation, moreover, echoes other recent studies suggesting that 
the ECJ is more responsive to member-state preferences than is popularly understood 




In the third step of LI, governments choose institutions to secure the bargain they just 
reached. The pooling of sovereignty and the delegation of authority to supranational 
institutions is, in this view, a deliberate choice, intended to increase the credibility of 
international agreements. In this respect, there is an overlap between LI and regime 
theory, which analyzes the ways in which institutions reduce transaction costs and 
provide policy-relevant information (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 72).  
 
However, there are two claims, one theoretical and one empirical, that distinguish LI 
from other accounts of EU institutions, and both have prompted ongoing debates in the 
field. The first claim is about the motives behind institutional choices. Moravcsik (1998, 
75) predicts that states pool sovereignty and delegate authority in areas where 
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governments are easily tempted to renege on agreements. A number of constructivist-
inspired writers, however, emphasize the role of ideas and ideology in the creation of the 
uniquely strong original Community (Parsons 2003) and the design of Eurozone 
institutions, including a remarkly independent European Central Bank (McNamara 1998), 
and the enlargment of the powers of the EP (Rittberger 2005) – none of which, it is 
argued, can be explained solely through the logic of credible commitments. 
 
The second claim concerns the long-term development of EU institutions and 
Moravcsik’s insistence that governments remained in control for most of this process. 
Scholars of historical institutionalism (HI) disagree, arguing that unintended 
consequences, institutional lock-ins, and path-dependent development led these 
institutions to develop in unexpected and suboptimal ways (Pierson 1996). Moravcsik 
counters that, since governments are motivated to constrain their successors’ future 
choices, the finding that subsequent governments are dissatisfied with an institution 
cannot be cited as evidence against LI’s theory of institutional choice (Moravcsik 1998, 
493). With this argument, Moravcsik therefore shifts the burden of proof onto historical 
institutionalists, challenging them to demonstrate poor judgment in the choice of EU 
institutions. 
 
This “LI/HI debate” is arguably a red herring. As Schimmelfennig (2018b) argues in this 
volume, LI is static in the sense that it does not explicitly theorize potential endogenous 
changes in its core ingredients: preferences, bargaining power, and institutional choice. 
Yet we, with Moravcsik (2018), would argue that liberal theories, more than other IR 
theories, are open to theorizing feedback given that cooperation necessarily induces 
structural economic shifts at the domestic level that bring new sets of interests to the fore.  
If this is true, however, then LI should be able to theorize explicitly about the conditions 
under which and the ways in which European integration shifts domestic preferences 
either toward greater support of integration (Moravcsik 1999, 380) as well as, potentially, 
against integration. The further development of LI in the direction of explicitly theorizing 
patterns of positive and negative feedback from initial institutional choices therefore 
represents a promising frontier for the theory, which could eliminate the false dichotomy 
between LI and HI, and instead emphasize their fundamental compatibility. We shall 
return to the question of endogenous change under the rubric of the EU’s constitutional 
compromise, below. 
 
Three Extensions of Liberal Intergovernmentalism 
 
In addition to his core claims, Moravcsik derived from LI three extensions, each of which 
addressed important normative and policy-relevant questions, taking new and 
controversial positions that have since become the subject of lively debates about (1) the 
EU’s putative democratic deficit, which Moravcsik decried as overblown; (2) the claim 
that the EU had, by the late 1990s, reached a ‘stable constitutional settlement’; and (3) 
the argument that the EU deserved the status of a global superpower, using its liberal 
strengths to defend European interests and values around the world.   
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Two features of these three extensions are particularly striking. First, although each 
argument is often read in isolation from LI, all three are deeply informed by the broader 
theory, and should be seen as policy-relevant extensions of it.  Second, and by contrast 
with those critics who mistakenly identified LI as ‘realist’ or even Euroskeptic, these 
extensions are fundamentally optimistic about the nature and future of the EU, suggesting 
that it is democratically defensible, fundamentally stable, and able to project its interests 
and values around the world. Whether such optimism is warranted in a time of multiple 
crises, however, has been contested.  
 
The Defensible Democratic Deficit? 
 
Moravcsik’s argument about the nature of EU institutions as commitment devices has 
important implications for normative debates about Europe’s putative ‘democratic 
deficit’. Most democratic deficit arguments put forward one or more of four critiques of 
the EU. First, it is argued, the EU erodes national democracy by supplanting, directly 
through new legislation and indirectly through ECJ rulings and regulatory competition, 
national laws adopted by democratically elected legislatures (Williams 1991). Second, 
EU institutions lack democratic accountability, given the strong role of indirectly elected 
politicians in the Council, the power of unelected supranational institutions, and the 
weakness of the EP (Greven 2000). Third, many scholars argue that the Union itself is 
structurally biased toward neoliberal values, given the centrality of the treaties’ free-
movement aims and the institutional hurdles to the adoption of EU social policies 
(Scharpf 1999). Fourth, Europe arguably lacks a demos, a group of people united by a 
sense of community, to legitimate an EU polity (Weiler 1995). Taken together, these 
critiques present a profoundly pessimistic picture of a democratically illegitimate Union. 
 
It was in this context that Moravcsik (2002) published, in the Journal of Common Market 
Studies, his famous ‘defense’ of the democratic deficit. Against a growing consensus, and 
consistent with LI assumptions, Moravcsik argued that, far from being a superstate, the 
EU was a strictly limited system of governance, with selected and mostly low-salience 
technical tasks, accountable to elected national governments. Far from running amuck, 
the EU bureaucracy was small and hemmed in by strict control mechanisms. And far 
from adopting radical neoliberal policies, the EU policy process was subject to strong 
consensus norms that prevented it from moving too far in any direction not favored by 
the public. For all these reasons, Moravcsik argued, ‘EU policy-making is, in nearly all 
cases, clean, transparent, effective and politically responsive to the demands of European 
citizens’ (605). In later work with Robert Keohane and Stephen Macedo (2009: 2), he 
generalized this argument from the EU to multilateral institutions more broadly, arguing 
that international governance can enhance domestic democracy, by limiting the sway of 
special interests, protecting minority rights from majoritarian domination, and improving 
the quality of democratic deliberation. 
 
Despite Moravcsik’s assurances, the debate over the EU’s democratic deficit has 
continued, and even heightened, over the past decade. In a forceful rebuttal, Føllesdal and 
Hix (2006) disputed the claim that EU politics produce centrist outcomes, because the 
‘reversion point’ in case of no agreement is a program of trade liberalization in which it is 
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easier to deregulate than to re-regulate the European economy. Furthermore, they argue, 
the EU’s supermajoritarian decision rules and extensive checks and balances risk 
producing, not centrist outcomes, but rather paralysis in the face of new challenges. 
Finally, as for Moravcsik’s argument about the low salience of EU policies, they suggest 
that a genuine European democratic debate could inform the public and render salient EU 
policies that create real winners and losers (Føllesdal and Hix 2006: 554).   
 
Hix, in this issue, returns to the question of the EU’s democratic deficit at times of 
unprecedented politicization and crisis, and against the background of a growing chasm 
between a largely pro-European political elite and an increasingly Euroskeptic mass 
public. Hix argues that the rising tide of Euroskepticism challenges LI’s optimism about 
the Union’s efficiency and/or its democratic accountability. He argues that if we assume 
with Moravcsik that governments are responsive to mobilized interests, then we might 
expect to see governments mirroring increasingly mobilized Euroskeptic public opinion, 
leading to deadlock and paralysis, as arguably occurred in response to the Eurozone and 
refugee crises. On the other hand, if we assume that European elites ‘collude’ to pursue 
European integration in the face of growing public criticism, they may incite ever greater 
support for anti-EU populists and exacerbate the Union’s democratic deficit. In the first 
instance we would predict a deadlocked Europe; in the second, an unaccountable one. 
 
The democratic deficit debate between Moravcsik and his critics, therefore, is both a 
normative debate about the appropriate standard of democratic legitimacy, and an 
empirical one about the responsiveness of political elites to an increasingly Euroskeptic 
public. In his response in this issue, Moracvsik (2018: xx) argues that, with the exception 
of the normatively and democratically questionable Euro project, the EU has been and 
remains responsive to the citizens of Europe. Future research in this area should aim to 
determine which, if any, of Hix’s scenarios most accurately captures mobilization and 
representation in a politicized EU.  
 
A Stable Constitutional Settlement? 
 
Many theories of European integration depict this phenomenon as a process with its own 
endogenous momentum, operating through mechanisms of functional and political 
spillover, socialization, and/or increasing returns (Haas 1958; Christiansen, Jørgensen, 
and Wiener 1999; Pierson 1996). Ironically, this view is popular both among pro-
European federalists, who depict the Union as a bicycle that must keep moving lest it fall 
over, and among Euroskeptics, who fear being pulled inexorably into an ever-closer 
union.   
 
By contrast with these views of integration as an endogenous process, LI posits that ‘the 
primary impetus for integration has been a series of exogenous functional challenges’ 
arising from ‘socioeconomic interdependence as filtered through interest group politics’ 
(Moravcsik 2005: 358, 364). This view, in turn, implies that we would expect integration 
to reach a stable endpoint in the absence of significant exogenous changes producing new 
functional pressures to undertake major reforms (359).   
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Consistent with these theoretical assumptions, Moravcsik argued, both alone and with 
Kalypso Nicolaïdis, that the EU had indeed, by the late 1990s, reached a constitutional 
settlement, ‘a stable endpoint of European integration in the medium term’ (Moravcsik 
2005: 364; Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis 1998). The Union, Moravcsik acknowledged, was 
not trapped in amber: ‘[It] may expand geographically, reform institutionally, and deepen 
substantively, but all this will take place largely within existing contours of European 
constitutional structures’ (Moravcsik 2005: 364).   
 
The stability of the European constitutional settlement, according to Moravcsik (2005), 
rests on three pillars. First, in substantive terms, the EU’s past ‘grand projects’ have 
produced a Union of limited scope, and there is no evidence of functional pressure to 
make more than ‘limited forays’ into bastions of national sovereignty such as defense, 
taxation, or social policy (264-67).  Second, the EU faces extraordinary institutional 
constraints to altering its constitutional structure, including the need for unanimous 
agreement of and ratification by a diverse group of member states (267). Third, 
Moravcsik dismisses normative arguments for fundamental constitutional change, 
arguing that efforts to engage citizens about EU politics will be counterproductive, 
leading to ‘unstable plebiscitary politics’ in which low-information voters ‘have no 
incentive to reconcile their concrete interests with their political choices’ (375).   
 
Clearly, the overlapping crises and the politicization of the EU over the past decade have 
imposed a stress test on LI’s claims about a stable constitutional settlement, prompting 
critiques from both optimists, predicting further integration, and pessimists, who raise the 
spectre of disintegration. 
 
On the optimistic side, we find scholars who identify positive feedbacks leading to 
further integration. In an influential article, Erik Jones, R. Daniel Kelemen and Sophie 
Meunier (2016) have offered a theory of ‘failing forward’, which they present as an 
amalgam of intergovernmentalist and neofunctionalist thinking. Drawing on 
intergovernmentalism, they argue that EU member governments typically adopt lowest-
common-denominator agreements representing short-term considerations and 
concessions to the most reticent member states. However, in line with neofunctionalism, 
they also argue that these imperfect initial decisions almost inevitably run into predictable 
crises. These crises lead member states to adopt incremental, integrative, yet still 
imperfect responses, thus creating an inefficient but inexorable process of failing forward 
in the direction of deeper integration. The authors apply their theory to the European 
sovereign debt crisis, shedding light on how EU governments, in a series of grudging 
responses, ultimately adopted landmark integrative decisions to establish the European 
Stabilization Mechanism and Banking Union. Sandra Lavenex (2018) has applied the 
same framework to asylum and immigration policy, although she pointedly notes that the 
EU can ‘fail forward’ towards a policy that is less protective toward immigrants than its 
predecessor.  
 
On the pessimistic side, we find a number of scholars who argue that negative feedbacks 
from earlier integrative steps can produce disintegration, defined as a reduction of 
institutional centralization, policy scope, or membership (Webber 2014: 342; 
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Schimmelfennig 2018a: 3). Douglas Webber, for example, surveys existing integration 
theories, including LI, arguing that these theories are generally optimistic about the 
resilience of a deeply interdependent and highly institutionalized EU, and provide few if 
any testable claims about the conditions under which the EU might disintegrate. Webber 
(2014: 343) suggests that European integration could be undone by the rising tide of anti-
European sentiment in domestic public opinion, or by the unwillingness of Germany to 
play the role of benevolent hegemon. In a similar vein, Hans Vollaard (2014: 13) argues 
that European integration has distributed its benefits unevenly across the EU population, 
producing a growing cohort of older, less educated, and increasingly dissatisfied 
‘immobiles’ lobbying for partial or full exit from the Union.   
 
In his article in this issue, Schimmelfennig (2018b) examines three recent events with 
genuine potential for disintegration, namely the Eurozone, refugee, and Brexit crises, 
applying LI alongside neofunctionalism and postfunctionalism, to assess the utility of 
each theory in explaining disintegration. He argues that LI outperforms its theoretical 
rivals in predicting national preferences over distributive issues in each crisis, as well as 
the subsequent intergovernmental bargaining over the terms of the EU’s responses. 
However, he also finds that positive and negative feedback effects from earlier 
integration played an important role in triggering all three crises—a phenomenon that, 
Moravcsik admits, is in principle compatible with, but remains undertheorized in LI. 
Schimmelfennig therefore argues for a ‘dynamic extension of LI’ that theorizes how 
previous integrative steps ‘feed back into intergovernmental preference and power 
constellations’.  
 
Where, then, does this leave the claim about Europe’s stable constitutional settlement?  In 
her contribution to this special issue, Kalypso Nicoloaïdis reassesses her earlier claims 
with Moravcsik, drawing on both LI and on her own normative demoicratic theory. 
Exploring the landmark moments of the past two decades, from the Amsterdam Treaty 
through the failed Constitutional Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty, the Eurozone crisis, and 
Brexit, Nicolaïdis offers two core arguments. Analytically, she argues that successive 
crises have indeed challenged the EU and exposed fundamental flaws in its initial design; 
yet the Union’s responses to these crises have been largely incremental and policy-based, 
with no fundamental changes in its constitutional structure. In this sense, the diagnosis of 
the EU as a stable constitutional settlement stands unchanged. Normatively, however, the 
status quo does not mitigate the flaws in the EU’s constitutional design, which must be 
faced if the EU is to remain democratically legitimate.   
 
In sum, the crises of the past decade and the politicization of the EU in national politics 
have posed both empirical and theoretical challenges to LI’s prediction of a stable 
constitutional settlement. Empirically, these crises have produced both integrative and 
disintegrative changes. Theoretically, we agree with Schimmelfennig and Moravcsik that 
LI should not be identified exclusively as a theory of exogenously driven change, but that 
it can and should be extended to examine endogenous processes of positive and negative 
feedbacks, driving integration, disintegration, and differentiated integration.  
 
Europe as a Superpower 
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As with the two previous extensions, Moravcsik’s claim that the EU is a global 
‘superpower’ is not just empirical but theoretical, pitting LI against the predictions of a 
rival—in this case realist—theory.  In realist theory, Moravcsik points out, power is 
linked to one’s relative share of global resources, and post-Cold War Europe has been 
widely viewed in relative military, economic, and demographic decline (Moravcsik 2009: 
406).  By contrast, LI argues that the sources of power in international politics are 
multiple and issue-specific, and Moravcsik has repeatedly suggested that the EU 
commands substantial military, civilian, and ‘soft’ or normative power, the combination 
of which allows the Union to project power around the world and across a wide variety of 
issue-areas (Moravcsik 2009, 2017).  Furthermore, Moravcsik has argued recently, 
European power is ‘crisis-proof’, with neither the Eurozone nor the migration crisis nor 
even Brexit fundamentally undermining the Union’s material and normative advantages 
in world politics (Moravcsik 2017: 16-17).   
 
In this issue, Sophie Meunier and Milada Vachudova engage this ‘European superpower’ 
thesis.  They agree that Europe’s formidable military, civilian, and normative resources 
make the EU a ‘potential’ superpower, but they argue that the translation of European 
resources into influence is subject to two potential road blocks.  First, they suggest that 
the EU’s two greatest foreign policy successes—namely its common trade policy and 
enlargement policy—have succeeded in exporting EU standards and values to the rest of 
the world in large part because the Union has centralized policy-making in these areas, 
allowing it to speak with one voice.  Second, in the context of Moravcsik’s conception of 
the EU as a liberal superpower, they argue that the rise of illiberalism in EU member 
states such as Hungary and Poland threatens to undermine the Union’s ability to agree 
upon and implement common policies in line with European values, as well as the 
Union’s ‘normative power’ vis-à-vis the rest of the world.   
 
While Meunier and Vachudova’s critique of the European superpower thesis focuses on 
the EU’s internal unity and commitment to liberalism, a second set of doubts arises from 
external changes in the world around Europe.  One of the core arguments of Moravcsik’s 
(2009: 408) liberal theory is that the EU is powerful in large part because of the post-
Cold War ‘trend toward greater economic interdependence, democratization and 
ideological homogeneity in the developed and developing world, which has led to a 
convergence of interest among most great powers’. These favorable external conditions 
for Europe appear increasingly fragile, however, as the core liberal values of democracy, 
human rights, and multilateralism come under attack not only from an assertive Russia 
but also from Donald Trump’s populist America (Kagan 2017; Posen 2018).  Whether 
Europe can, in such circumstances, continue to advance its liberal values and protect the 
core institutions of the liberal international order remains a fundamental question for 




Liberal intergovernmentalist theory has served for a quarter century as a central, or even 
baseline, theory for our understanding of the EU and the process of European integration. 
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As such, LI has shaped EU studies like no other theory since Haas’s original formulation 
of neofunctionalism in the 1950s. This special issue, with its critical and constructive 
engagement of Moravcsik’s work, is a testament to this achievement and to LI’s 
continuing relevance. We have, appropriately, reserved the last word to Moravcsik, who 
responds in a concluding essay to his critics, sketching a vision for an LI further 
elaborated and extended to provide analytical purchase on the EU in the 21
st
 century.   
 
Liberal intergovernmentalism, Moravcsik (2018) suggests in his response, is richer than 
its critics portray it, fully capable of theorizing phenomena such as the endogenous 
impact of integration on European societies, as well as the rise of Euroskeptic public 
opinion in the wake of highly salient events and failed policies such as the Eurozone and 
migration crises of the past decade. In his response, Moravcsik credits historical 
institutionalists and postfunctionalist scholars for updating and refining older ‘grand 
integration theories’ such as neofunctionalism and federalism, and for problematizing 
new empirical phenomena. At the same time, Moravcsik criticizes these and other 
theories for overstating their distinctiveness and understating LI’s ability to come to grips 
with EU politics in our current age of crisis. In fact, he argues, both theories would 
remain indeterminate if they didn’t borrow liberal mechanisms in order to explain (as 
with historical institutionalists) national preferences or (as with postfunctionalists) 
interstate interaction and institutional choices.  
 
In empirical terms, Moravcsik counsels against alarmist readings of recent trends 
presaging the disintegration of the Union. He argues against historical institutionalists 
that genuinely unwelcome and uncontrolled feedback effects are rare, and against 
postfunctionalists that the rise of Euroskeptic public opinion is explicable in terms of the 
EU’s recent policy failures and does not fundamentally endanger the Union’s decades-old 
constitutional compromise.  Consistent with this view, Moravcsik concludes his response 
with a cautiously optimistic assessment of the Union’s fundamental health and its 
prospects in the 21
st
 century.  The accuracy of these assessments will be adjudicated by 







Bickerton, C., Hodson, D., and Puetter, U. (2015) ‘The New Intergovernmentalism: 
European Integration in the Post-Maastricht Era’, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, Vol. 53, No. 4, pp. 703-722. 
Carrubba, C.J., and Gabel, M.J. (2017) International Courts and the Performance of 
International Agreements: A General Theory with Evidence from the European 
Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).  
Christiansen, T., Jorgensen, K.E., and Wiener, A. eds. (2001). The Social Construction of 
Europe (London: Sage). 
Cowles, M.G., Caporaso, J.A. and Risse, T., eds. (2001). Transforming Europe. 
Europeanization and Domestic Political Change (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press). 
de Wilde, P., Leupold, A., and Schmidtke. H. (2016). ‘Introduction: The Differentiated 
Politicisation of European Governance’, West European Politics, Vol. 39, No. 1, 
pp. 3-22.  
Dworkin, A., and Leonard, M. (2018).  ‘Can Europe Save the World Order?’ ECFR 
Policy Report, 
http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/can_Europe_save_the_world_order.  
Fabbrini, S., and Puetter, U. (2016). ‘Integration without Supranationalisation: Studying 
the Lead Roles of the European Council and the Council in post-Lisbon EU 
Politics’, Journal of European Integration, Vol. 38, No. 5, pp. 481-495. 
Føllesdal, A., and Hix, S. (2006). ‘Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A 
Response to Majone and Moravcsik’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 44, 
No. 3, pp. 533-562. 
Grande, E., and Hutter, S. (2016). ‘Introduction: European Integration and the Challenge 
of Politicization’, in Kriesi, H., and Hutter, S., eds. Politicising Europe: 
Integration and Mass Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 3-
31. 
Grande, E., and Kriesi, H. (2016). ‘Conclusions: The Postfunctionalists Were (Almost) 
Right’, in Politicising Europe: Integration and Mass Politics, edited by Edgar 
Grande, Hanspeter Kriesi and Swen Hutter, 3-31. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Greven, M. (2000). ‘Can the European Union Finally Become a Democracy?’ in Greven, 
M. and Paul, L., eds., Democracy beyond the State? The European Dilemma and 
the Emerging Global Order (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield), pp. 35-61. 
Haas, E.B. (1961). ‘International Integration. The European and the Universal Process’, 
International Organization, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 366-392. 
Hix, S. (2008). What's Wrong with the European Union and How to Fix it (London: 
Polity Press). 
 17 
______ (2018).  ‘When Optimism Fails:  Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Citizen 
Representation’, Journal of Common Market Studies, this issue. 
Hobolt, S., and de Vries, C. (2016). ‘Public Support for European Integration’, Annual 
Review of Political Science, Vol. 19, pp. 413-432. 
Hoffmann, S. (1966). ‘Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case 
of Western Europe’, Daedalus, Vol. 95, No. 3, pp. 862-915. 
Hooghe, L., and Marks, G. (2009). ‘A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: 
From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus’, British Journal of 
Political Science no. 39 (01):1-23. 
———. 2018. ‘Cleavage Theory Meets Europe’s Crises: Lipset, Rokkan, and the 
Transnational Cleavage’, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 
109-135. 
Jones, E., Kelemen, R.D., and Meunier, S. (2016).  ‘Failing Forward? The Euro Crisis 
and the Incomplete Nature of European Integration’, Comparative Political 
Studies Vol. 49, No. 7, pp. 1010–1034.  
Kagan, R. (2017). ‘The Twilight of the Liberal World Order’, 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/the-twilight-of-the-liberal-world-order.   
Larsson, O., and Naurin, D. (2016). ‘Judicial Independence and Political Uncertainty: 
How the Risk of Override Affects the Court of Justice of the EU’, International 
Organization Vol. 70, No. 2, pp. 377-408.  
Keohane, R.O., Macedo, S., and Moravcsik, A. (2009). ‘Democracy-Enhancing 
Multilateralism’, International Organization, Vol. 63, No. 1, pp. 1-31. 
Kleine, M. (2013). Informal Governance in the European Union. How Governments 
Make International Organizations Work (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). 
Lavenex, S. (2018).  ‘“Failing Forward” Towards Which Europe? Organized Hypocrisy 
in the Common European Asylum System,” Journal of Common Market Studies,” 
on-line first, DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12739. 
Lewis, J. (1998). ‘Is the “Hard Bargaining” Image of the Council Misleading? The 
Committee of Permanent Representatives and the Local Elections Directive,’ 
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 479-504. 
McNamara, K. (1998). The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Union 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press). 
______ (2018). ‘From IO to Authority: the European Union in Comparative Political 
Perspective’, Journal of Common Market Studies, this issue. 
Meunier, S., and Vachudova, M. (2018).  ‘Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Illiberalism, 
and the Potential Superpower of the European Union’, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, this issue. 
 
 18 
Moravcsik, A. (1993). ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal 
Intergovernmentalist Approach’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 31, No. 
4, pp. 473-524. 
———(1997). ‘Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,’ 
International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4, pp. 513-553. 
———(1998). The Choice for Europe:  Social Purpose and State Power From Rome to 
Maastricht (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). 
———(1999). ‘A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and International 
Cooperation,’ International Organization, Vol. 53, No. 2, pp. 267-306. 
———(2001). ‘Bringing Constructivist Integration Theory Out of the Clouds: Has it 
Landed Yet?’ European Union Politics, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 226-240. 
———(2002). ‘In Defence of the "Democratic Deficit": Reassessing Legitimacy in the 
European Union’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, No. 4, pp. 603-24. 
———(2005). ‘The European Constitutional Compromise and the neofunctionalist 
legacy,’ Journal of European Public Policy no. 12 (2):349-386. 
———(2009). ‘Europe: The Quiet Superpower’, French Politics, Vol. 7, No. 3–4, pp. 
403–22.  
———(2017). ‘Europe Is Still a Superpower’, Foreign Policy, April 13.  
______(2018). ‘European Integration in the 21
st
 Century:  A Liberal Intergovernmentalist 
Approach’, Journal of Common Market Studies, this issue. 
Moravcsik, A., and Schimmelfennig, F. (2009). ‘Liberal Intergovernmentalism’, in Diez, 
T., and Wiener, A. (eds.), European Integration Theory (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press), pp. 67-87. 
Naurin, D. (2018). ‘Liberal intergovernmentalism in the Councils of the EU: A Baseline 
Theory? Journal of Common Market Studies, this issue. 
Nicolaïdis, K. (2018). ‘Braving the Waves? Europe’s Constitutional Settlement at 
Twenty’, Journal of Common Market Studies, this issue. 
Owen, E., and Walter, S. (2017). ‘Open Economy Politics and Brexit: Insights, Puzzles, 
and Ways Forward,’ Review of International Political Economy no.24 (2): 179-
202. 
Parsons, C. (2003). A Certain Idea of Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). 
Phelan, W. (2018). ‘European Legal Integration: Towards a Liberal Intergovernmentalist 
Approach’, Journal of Common Market Studies, this issue. 
Pierson, P. (1996). ‘The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist 
Analysis’, Comparative Political Studies Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 123-163. 
Pollack, M. (2003). The Engines of European Integration (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press). 
 19 
Pollack, M. (forthcoming). ‘Rational Choice and Historical Institutionalism’, in Wiener, 
A., Börzel, T., and Risse, T. (eds), European Integration Theory (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press). 
Posen, B.R. (2018).  ‘The Rise of Illiberal Hegemony:  Trump’s Surprising Grand 
Strategy’, Foreign Affairs, March/April.   
Risse, T. (2010). A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public 
Spheres (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). 
Risse, T. (forthcoming).  ‘Social Constructivism and European Integration,” in Wiener, 
A., Börzel, T., and Risse, T. (eds), European Integration Theory (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press). 
Rittberger, B. (2005). Building Europe's Parliament. Democratic Representation Beyond 
the Nation-State (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Scharpf, F. (1999). Governing in Europe. Effective and Democratic? (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press). 
Schimmelfennig, F. (2015). ‘What's the News in “New Intergovernmentalism”? A 
Critique of Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter’, Journal of Common Market Studies 
Vol. 53, No. 4, pp. 723-730. 
_____(2018a).  ‘Brexit: Differentiated Disintegration in the European Union,’ Journal of 
European Public Policy, published on-line first, 25 April. 
_____(2018b). ‘Liberal Intergovernmentalism and the Crises of the European Union’, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, this issue. 
Schmidt, V. (2008). ‘Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and 
Discourse,’ Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 11, pp. 303-326. 
______ (2018). ‘Rethinking EU Governance: From “Old” to “New” Approaches to Who 
is Steering Integration’, Journal of Common Market Studies, this issue. 
Vollaard, Hans (2014). ‘Explaining European Disintegration,’ Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol. 52, No. 5, pp. 1142–59. 
Waever, O. (2018). ‘A Post-Western Europe’, Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 32, No. 
2, pp. 75-88. 
Webber, Douglas (2014). ‘How Likely Is it that the European Union will disintegrate? A 
critical analysis of competing theoretical perspectives,’ European Journal of 
International Relations no.20 (2): 341–65. 
Weiler, J.H.H. (1995). ‘Does Europe Need a Constitution? Demos, Telos and the German 
Maastricht Decision’, European Law Journal, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 219-258. 
Williams, S. (1991). ‘Sovereignty and Accountability,’ Keohane, R.O., and Hoffmann, 
S., eds., The New European Community (Boulder: Westview), pp. 155-76. 
Zürn, M. (2016). ‘Opening up Europe: Next Steps in Politicisation Research’, West 
European Politics, Vol. 39, No. 1, pp. 164-182. 
 20 
Zürn, M., and Checkel, J. (2005). ‘Getting Socialized to Build Bridges: Constructivism 
and Rationalism, Europe and the Nation-State’, International Organization, Vol. 
59, No. 4, pp. 1045-1079. 
 
